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We introduce elements of an auction in a rent-seeking contest. Players
compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying eﬀorts, they also
submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. First, we
analyze the model if the returns-to-scale parameters of both bids and
eﬀorts are unity. In that case there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid,
while the sum of all eﬀorts equals that bid. Second, we analyze the
case in which the returns-to-scale parameters diﬀer from unity, and
derive the implications of that speciﬁcation.
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1 Introduction
In many economic situations, a number of contestants try to obtain some
prize or rent. Several mechanisms can be used to assign a prize to one of the
competitors. One obvious way to do so is through a regular auction. Then,
all contestants submit a bid and as a rule the one submitting the highest bid
obtains the prize, and pays an amount that depends in some pre-described
way on the total vector of bids. In the simplest case, a ﬁrst-price sealed bid
auction, the highest bidder pays his own bid, whereas the other bidders pay
nothing.1 In the case of policy decisions, the parties involved often exert
eﬀort in an attempt to inﬂuence the decision process. This eﬀort can take
the form of lobbying, but can also consist of bribes. Such a process can
be modelled as an all-pay auction or a rent-seeking contest. In an all-pay
auction (see e.g. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993), all contestants have
to pay for their eﬀort, and the one with the highest eﬀort wins the auction.
In a rent-seeking contest, all players also exert some eﬀort, but the outcome
of the process is stochastic: each contestant wins with a probability that is
increasing in his own eﬀort, but decreasing in that of his competitors. The
extensive literature on such contests started with Tullock (1980).2
Yet, in practice, we often have situations that lie somewhere between the
two extremes of rent-seeking contests and regular auctions. An example is
the procedure by which major sports events, such as the Olympic Games, are
assigned to cities or countries. On the one hand, this decision is inﬂuenced
by lobbying or bribing. Yet, the contestants also submit bids, which come in
the form of e.g. the quality or quantity of new stadiums and infrastructure,
which will only be built by a city or country if it becomes the actual organiser
of the event. As another example, note that often when an auction is held,
the outcome is not solely determined by the height of the bid. In many cases,
other aspects of the competing oﬀers also play a role. In public procurement,
the quality of the oﬀers made is also taken into account, usually by some
predeﬁned rule that weighs diﬀerent quantiﬁable quality criteria of the oﬀers
made. A ﬁnal example is a takeover battle. Suppose two ﬁrms try to take
over a third ﬁrm. Both ﬁrms submit a bid. Shareholders decide whom to
tender their shares to. They will usually base their decisions not only on the
bids submitted, but also on the extent to which they feel each ﬁrm contributes
to the long-term prospects of the ﬁrm being taken over.3 Thus, in practice
we often see hybrid forms of rent-seeking contests and regular auctions.
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literature, but assume that the probability of winning not only depends on
the eﬀort exerted, but also on the bid made. A bid is payable for a player only
if he wins the prize. This is the ﬁrst-price sealed bid aspect of our model.
In section 2, we describe our general framework, and show that it can be
seen as an extension of the standard rent-seeking game. In section 3, we
consider the simplest possible version of our model in which returns-to-scale
parameters of both bids and eﬀorts are equal to unity. We demonstrate for
this model the existence of a unique (Nash) equilibrium in pure strategies.
Denoting a player as active if and only if he submits positive bid and eﬀort,
it turns out that in the equilibrium one of the following two possibilities
must hold: either all players are active, or there is a subset of players with a
relatively high valuation of the prize who are active whereas the other players
with a relatively low valuation of the prize are not active. We further show
that in the equilibrium (a) each active player submits the same bid, (b) the
sum of all eﬀorts equals that bid, and (c) there is underdissipation of rent.
Furthermore, we give the equilibrium solution in explicit form for the case of
equal valuations, and for the case in which there are only two contestants.
Section 4 uses a more general model, in which the returns-to-scale parameters
of bids and eﬀorts may diﬀer from unity, and derives the implications of that
speciﬁcation. If a pure strategy equilibrium in which all players are active
exists, it now has that the sum of all individual ratios of eﬀort and bid,
equals the ratio of the returns-to-scale parameters associated with eﬀorts
and bids. We further present a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a
unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies of this model for the case of
equal valuations. Section 5 concludes.
2 The general model
Our basic model is the following. There are n > 1 given players trying to
obtain some prize. Player i values the prize at vi > 0. We thus allow for
asymmetric valuations. Diﬀerent from the auction literature, but consistent
with the rent-seeking literature, we assume that the valuations vi are common
knowledge. Each player i can submit a bid bi ≥ 0, and spend eﬀort ei ≥ 0.
The bid bi only has to be paid if i wins the prize. However, eﬀort outlays ei
are sunk. A player cannot retrieve these, regardless of whether or not he wins






, i = 1,...,n, (1)
if bj > 0 and ej > 0 for at least one j, and pi = 0 if that is not the case.
Here, f(bi,ei) is non-negative, and ∂f/∂bi, ∂f/∂ei ≥ 0. This implies ∂pi/∂bi,
∂pi/∂ei ≥ 0, and ∂pi/∂bj, ∂pi/∂ej ≤ 0 (j 6= i). Thus, based on the bid bi and
the eﬀort ei, a ‘score’ f(bi,ei) is computed for each player. The probability
that a certain player wins this contest, is equal to the share of his score in
the total sum of scores. Note that these probabilities sum to unity.4 Given
(1), player i maximizes his expected payoﬀ, given by
Πi = pi (vi − bi) − ei. (2)
This expression reﬂects that the bid only has to be paid if the player wins
the prize, whereas the eﬀort outlays are non-refundable.
A natural assumption is that the score f(bi,ei) links bi and ei in some
multiplicative fashion. In that way, we capture the idea that there is a trade-
oﬀ between bid bi and eﬀort ei, and that both a positive bid and a positive
eﬀort are necessary to have a positive probability of winning. In section 3,
we simply assume f(bi,ei) = biei, which we denote as a constant-returns-to-




i , with α,β > 0 returns-to-scale parameters of, respectively,
the bids and eﬀorts. Such a more general function, however, leads to a less
tractable model.






vi − ei. (3)
Many papers in this literature assume g(ei) = ei. Hillman and Riley (1989)
analyze this model, allowing for n contestants and asymmetric valuations.
Ellingsen (1991) gives an application. Our model in section 3 can be seen as
a generalization of this approach. Some papers, including Tullock (1980), use
a more general contest success function g(ei) = er
i, with r > 0. Nti (1999)
analyzes this model, allowing for asymmetric valuations, but restricting at-
tention to the case n = 2. Our model in section 4 generalizes this approach.
Finally, we refer to Skaperdas (1996) and Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997)
for a general discussion of the foundations of logit form contest success func-
tions in rent-seeking models.Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 5
3 A constant-returns-to-scale score
In this section we use the constant-returns-to-scale score f(bi,ei) = biei. The







(vi − bi) − ei (4)
if bj > 0 and ej > 0 for at least one j, and Πi = 0 otherwise. We look for Nash
equilibria in pure strategies. Without loss of generality, order valuations such













for 0 < b < vm , with m = 2,...,n. For ﬁxed m, the function hm(b) is strictly
increasing in b. Moreover, limb↓0 hm(b) = −∞, and limb↑vm hm(b) = ∞. This
implies that hm(b) has a unique root, b(m) say, on (0,vm), i.e. hm(b(m)) = 0.
It is not possible to ﬁnd a general closed form expression for b(m).
In an equilibrium, not every player necessarily submits a positive bid
and eﬀort. There are circumstances in which a player i is better oﬀ setting
bi = ei = 0, and earning zero expected proﬁts. We will describe such a player
as inactive. The following theorem now states the unique equilibrium of our
model.
Theorem 1 With n > 1 players, whose valuations are given by v1 ≥ v2 ≥
... ≥ vn, there is a unique equilibrium (ˆ b1,...,ˆ bn, ˆ e1,..., ˆ en). There is some
player k (2 ≤ k ≤ n), such that in the equilibrium every player j with
vj ≥ vk is active, whereas the other players (if any) are inactive. With b(m)
the unique root of the function hm(b) as deﬁned in (5), with m = 2,...,n,
we have:
(i) ˆ bi = b(k), for all i = 1,...,k,
(ii) ˆ ei =
ˆ bi(vi−2ˆ bi)
(vi−ˆ bi) , for all i = 1,...,k,
(iii)
Pk
i=1 ˆ ei = b(k),
(iv) k = supm {m : b(m) < vm/2}.Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 6
Proof. See the Appendix.
The unique equilibrium has a number of interesting properties. First,
all active players submit the same bid b(k), regardless of their valuation.
This implies that, in equilibrium, diﬀerences in success probabilities of active
players are solely determined by diﬀerences in the eﬀorts ˆ ei. Second, the bid
b(k) every active player submits, equals the sum of total eﬀorts. Third, that
bid is strictly increasing in the size of the valuations of the active players:
∂b(k)/∂vi > 0, ∀i = 1,...,k. This can be seen from (i) of Theorem 1 and (5).
Fourth, equilibrium bid and eﬀorts are linear homogeneous in valuations:
if all valuations are multiplied with the same factor, then the equilibrium
bid and eﬀorts all are multiplied with this factor as well. Fifth, we have
ˆ e1 ≥ ˆ e2 ≥ ... ≥ ˆ ek > 0. Thus, the higher the valuation of an active player,
the greater the eﬀort he exerts. Sixth, ˆ p1 ≥ ˆ p2 ≥ ... ≥ ˆ pk > 0, which follows
from the fact that ˆ pi = ˆ ei/b(k). Thus, the player with the highest valuation
also has the highest probability to win the prize. Seventh, a player with a
higher valuation also has a higher expected proﬁt: b Π1 ≥ b Π2 ≥ ... ≥ b Πk > 0.
This follows from the fact that b Πi = (vi−2b(k))2/(vi−b(k)) for i = 1,...,k.
Eighth, if not all players are active, then only the players with the highest
valuations are. Finally, all n players are active if and only if b(n) < vn/2.
Now consider the extent of rent dissipation that occurs in equilibrium.
To study this issue, we need a deﬁnition of rent dissipation in the context of
our model. Usually, it is deﬁned as the total sum of eﬀorts of the contestants
trying to obtain the prize. Yet, in our model, there is also a bid b(k) paid by
the winner. Arguably, this should not be counted as rent dissipation, since
it merely consists of a transfer from the winner of the prize to the authority
selling the prize. On the other hand, it is often argued that eﬀorts ˆ ei consist
of bribes rather than eﬀorts. Since bribes are also merely transfers, then
if bribes are counted as dissipated rent, winning bids should also be. We
therefore consider both possibilities. First, suppose that the winning bid is
considered as dissipated rent. Total dissipation then equals D =
P
i ˆ ei+b(k).
Using Theorem 1, it follows that D = 2b(k) < vk. Thus, in this case there is
always underdissipation of rent: total rent dissipation is less than the size of
(even) the smallest valuation of the prize among the active players. If we do
not consider the winning bid as dissipated rent, then total rent dissipation,
D0 say, satisﬁes D0 = 1
2D < 1
2vk. Again there is always underdissipation of
rent.Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 7
3.1 The case of n equal valuations
Now consider the case in which all players have the same valuation. We then
obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 Take the model with n > 1 players. If vi = v,∀i, then the
unique equilibrium bids and eﬀorts are given by:
(i) ˆ bi = b(n) =
(n−1)v
(2n−1),∀i,
(ii) ˆ ei =
(n−1)v
(2n−1)n,∀i.
Proof. See the Appendix.
For this case, we do have explicit solutions for ˆ bi and ˆ ei. Therefore, we
can explicitly characterize the extent of rent dissipation in equilibrium. If
the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent, then total rent dissipation
is 2
3v with n = 2, and it strictly increases to v as n goes to inﬁnity. If the
winning bid is not considered as dissipated rent, then total rent dissipation
is 1
3v with n = 2, and it strictly increases to 1
2v as n goes to inﬁnity. In
the standard rent-seeking model, total rent dissipation equals (n−1)v/n, see
e.g. Hillman and Riley (1989). Thus, in our model, total rent dissipation is
lower than in the standard rent-seeking model when the winning bid is not
considered as dissipated rent, but higher when it is.
For the standard rent-seeking model, equilibrium eﬀorts are e∗
i = e∗ =
(n−1)v/n2,∀i and expected payoﬀs π∗
i = v/n2, see again Hillman and Riley








In a regular (ﬁrst-price) auction, it is easy to see that each player would bid
the common valuation of the prize (v), leaving expected payoﬀs equal to zero.
Therefore, in our model, expected payoﬀs for contestants are higher than in
a regular auction, but lower than in a standard rent-seeking contest.
3.2 The case of two players
Next, we return to the general model in which valuations are allowed to
diﬀer, but restrict attention to the case of two contestants, thus n = 2. We
then have the following result.Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 8
Corollary 2 Take the model with n = 2 players. The unique equilibrium
bids and eﬀorts are given by:






(ii) ˆ ei =
ˆ bi(vi−2ˆ bi)
(vi−ˆ bi) ,
for i = 1,2. Substituting ˆ bi = b(2) into (ii), we have an explicit solution for
ˆ ei.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Suppose we consider the winning bid b(2) as dissipated rent. Total rent
dissipation then equals D = ˆ e1 + ˆ e2 + b(2) = 2b(2). In order to study the
eﬀect of asymmetry, suppose the sum of valuations of both contestants is
ﬁxed: v1 + v2 = V. Assuming that v1 ≥ v2, we may write v1 = ρV and
v2 = (1−ρ)V, with ρ ∈ [1
2,1). We can study the eﬀect of decreased asymmetry

















1 − 3ρ(1 − ρ)
V. (8)
Thus, rent dissipation is maximized when ρ = 1
2, i.e. when the two valuations
are equal. Further, ∂D/∂ρ < 0 for all ρ ∈ (1
2,1). Therefore, with two players,
we have that more equal valuations lead to higher total rent dissipation. 5
This result does not hinge on the deﬁnition of rent dissipation. When we
also take the winning bid into account, total rent dissipation simply equals
D0 = 1
2D.
4 A general Cobb-Douglas score
In the previous section, we analyzed a model where the returns-to-scale pa-
rameters associated with both bidding and exerting eﬀort equal unity. In




i . The returns-to-scale parameters satisfy α,β > 0. Hence, the model an-
alyzed in the previous section is a special case of this model, with α = β = 1.













(vi − bi) − ei (9)
if bj > 0 and ej > 0 for at least one j, and Πi = 0 otherwise.
For this model we have the following general result.
Theorem 2 Take the model with n > 1 players. Consider an equilibrium












Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, if we have an equilibrium in which all players are active, then the
sum of all individual ratios of the eﬀort and bid, equals the ratio of the
returns-to-scale parameters associated with eﬀorts and bids. This theorem
has a natural interpretation. As β, the parameter that reﬂects returns to scale
with respect to the eﬀorts increases, then eﬀorts become more important, in
the sense that the sum of the individual ratios of the equilibrium eﬀort and
equilibrium bid increases. As α, the parameter that reﬂects returns to scale
with respect to bids increases, then bids become more important, in the sense
that the sum of the individual ratios of the equilibrium eﬀort and equilibrium
bid decreases.
To further analyze this model, we assume that all contestants have equal
valuations. Even for the case of two players, it is in general not possible to
ﬁnd the equilibrium with both agents active in closed form.6
4.1 The case of n equal valuations
Suppose that all players have equal valuations. We then have the following
result.
Theorem 3 Take the model with n > 1 players. Suppose that vi = v,∀i,
and β ≤ 1. Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with bids and
eﬀorts given by:Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 10
(i) ˆ bi = ˆ b =
α(n−1)v
α(n−1)+n,∀i,




Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, when valuations are equal, β ≤ 1 is a suﬃcient condition for the ex-
istence of a unique symmetric equilibrium. Again, bids and eﬀorts are linear
homogeneous in the valuation v. Second, if α, the returns-to-scale parameter
of bids, increases, then equilibrium bids strictly increase, whereas the equi-
librium eﬀorts strictly decrease. Third, if β, the returns-to-scale parameter
of eﬀorts, increases, then equilibrium eﬀorts strictly increase. There is no
eﬀect on equilibrium bids. Fourth, in equilibrium the probability that player








nv − β(n − 1)v
α(n − 1) + n
!
, (11)
which is positive, because we assumed that β ≤ 1.
Using Theorem 3, we can again study the extent of rent dissipation.
Suppose that the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent. We then have
from Theorem 3 that
D = nˆ e +ˆ b =
(α + β)(n − 1)v
α(n − 1) + n
. (12)
Consequently, with two contestants, total rent dissipation is (α+β)v/(α+2).
The extent of rent dissipation strictly increases to (α + β)v/(α+1) as n goes




n − β(n − 1)
(αn − α + n)
2 (n − 1)v, (13)
which is positive, since by assumption β ≤ 1. Thus here, rent dissipation
strictly increases in α and β.
Now suppose we do not count the winning bid as dissipated rent. From
Theorem 3 we obtain
D
0 = nˆ e =
β(n − 1)v
α(n − 1) + n
. (14)
With two contestants, total rent dissipation now equals βv/(α + 2). The
extent of rent dissipation strictly increases to βv/(α+1) as n goes to inﬁnity.Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 11
Rent dissipation now strictly decreases in α, but strictly increases in β. It is
easy to verify that there is always underdissipation of rent, regardless of the
treatment of the winning bid.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a model that combines a rent-seeking contest
with elements of a ﬁrst-price (sealed bid) auction. The model considers a
situation in which players compete for a prize. The probability that a player
wins the prize depends not only on the amount of eﬀort exerted, but also on
the bid submitted. The bid only has to be paid if the player wins the prize,
the eﬀort outlays are sunk.
First, we discussed the model with constant returns to scale in both bids
and eﬀorts. We showed the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies for that model. Further, we found that in such an equilibrium
all active players will submit the same bid, regardless of their valuations,
and that total eﬀorts equal that bid. Moreover, we found underdissipation
of rent. For the two player case, we showed that the extent of total rent
dissipation is strictly decreasing in the extent of asymmetry in valuations.
Second, we studied pure strategy Nash equilibria of a more general model,
in which the probability of success depends on a general Cobb-Douglas func-
tion in bids and eﬀorts. We demonstrated for that model that in an equilib-
rium in which all players are active, the sum of the individual ratios of the
eﬀort and bid is equal to the ratio of their respective returns-to-scale parame-
ters. Focusing on the case of equal valuations, we showed that the model has
a unique symmetric equilibrium if the returns-to-scale parameter of eﬀorts is
not greater than unity. We showed that in equilibrium there is underdissipa-
tion of rent. Total rent dissipation strictly increases in the returns-to-scale
parameter of eﬀorts. If the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent, then
total rent dissipation strictly increases in the returns-to-scale parameter of
bids, whereas if it is not, total rent dissipation is strictly decreasing in this
parameter.Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 12
Appendix
Proofs of section 3
To prove the results in section 3, we ﬁrst state the ﬁrst-order conditions for
an interior solution of player i0s maximization problem, given bids bj and







ei (vi − 2bi) − bie2
i (vi − bi)
P
j bjej
















2 − 1 = 0. (A.2)
In stating these, we implicitly assume
P
j6=i bjej > 0.
Next, we present three lemma’s that will be used in the proofs of Theo-
rem 1 and its corollaries. Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal bid and eﬀort
of player i, given bids and eﬀorts of the other players.
Lemma 1 Take the model with n > 1 players. Consider player i. Let ci =
P
j6=i bjej > 0. Then the optimal bid and eﬀort of player i, ˜ bi and ˜ ei, are as
follows:





, then ˜ bi = ˜ ei = 0. Hence, ˜ Πi = 0.





, then ˜ bi = ¯ bi and ˜ ei = ci(vi−2¯ bi)/¯ b2
i, with ¯ bi the unique root
of the continuous auxiliary function ki(b) = b3 −ci(vi −b), b ∈ (0,vi). In this
case 0 < ˜ bi < vi/2 and ˜ ei > 0, and ˜ Πi > 0.
Proof. Given ci > 0, player i considers three possible options. If he chooses
bi = 0, then his corresponding best eﬀort is 0, and his expected payoﬀ also
is. If i chooses ei = 0, his expected payoﬀ equals 0 irrespective of his bid. If i
chooses positive bid and eﬀort, these must satisfy (A.1) and (A.2). Rewriting
these yields
ci(vi − bi) = bi(biei + ci) (A.3)
and












Deﬁning the function ki(b) = b3−ci(vi−b) for 0 < b < vi, we have that ki(b) is
strictly increasing in b, that limb↓0 ki(b) = −civi < 0, and that limb↑vi ki(b) =
v3
i > 0. This implies that ki(b) has a unique root ¯ bi on (0,vi). Thus there
exist bi > 0 and ei > 0 that satisfy (A.5) and (A.6) if and only if ¯ bi < vi/2.
In particular, if ¯ bi < vi/2, then the relevant bi and ei are unique and given
by bi = ¯ bi > 0 and ei = ci(vi −2¯ bi)/¯ b2
i > 0. Moreover, using (A.3) and (A.5),











ei > 0, i.e. the expected payoﬀ is













follows that ¯ bi < vi/2 if and only if ci < (vi/2)2. The proof of the lemma
now follows directly.
Lemma 2 Consider for n = 2 the function h2(b) as deﬁned in (5), with









2 − 3v1v2 (A.7)
and satisﬁes b(2) < v2/2.
Proof. Straightforward manipulations show that b(2) is given by (A.7).
We then have to show that b(2) < v2/2, i.e. v2 − 2b(2) > 0. Now,













2 − 3v1v2 > 2v1 − v2. (A.8)
With v1 ≥ v2, the rhs of this expression is positive. Taking squares on both
sides and rearranging, (A.8) simpliﬁes to 3v2
2 > 0, which is always satisﬁed.
Lemma 3 Take the model with n > 1 players, whose valuations are given
by v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn. Let b(n) be the unique root of the function hn(b)
as deﬁned in (5). Then there exists an equilibrium (ˆ b1,...,ˆ bn, ˆ e1,..., ˆ en) in
which all n players are active if and only if b(n) < vn/2. Moreover, if such
an equilibrium exists, then it is the unique equilibrium in which all players
participate, and the bids and eﬀorts satisfy:Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 14
(i) ˆ bi = b(n), for all i = 1,...,n,
(ii) ˆ ei =
ˆ bi(vi−2ˆ bi)
(vi−ˆ bi) , for all i = 1,...,n,
(iii)
Pn
i=1 ˆ ei = b(n).
Proof.
— First, assume that (ˆ b1,...,ˆ bn, ˆ e1,..., ˆ en) is an equilibrium with ˆ bi > 0
and ˆ ei > 0, ∀i. We then have to show that b(n) < vn/2, that there cannot
exist another equilibrium in which all n players are active, and that the given
equilibrium bids and eﬀorts satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii) of the lemma. Note that,
using (A.1) and (A.2), in the given equilibrium we must have ˆ bi < vi/2, ∀i.








































Substituting (A.9) into (A.10) yields ˆ b2
i
P












ˆ bjˆ ej. (A.11)
The rhs of (A.11) is a constant, independent of i. Thus we can write ˆ b for the
bid of each player. Hence, the condition ˆ bi < vi/2, ∀i, reduces to ˆ b < vn/2.





Using (A.12), (A.9) implies

ˆ b2 −ˆ bˆ ei

(vi −ˆ b) = ˆ b3, so we have
ˆ ei =
ˆ b(vi − 2ˆ b)
(vi −ˆ b)
. (A.13)Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 15
























= n − 1. (A.14)
From (A.14), ˆ b is a root of hn(b) of (5). Since hn(b) has a unique root, ˆ b =
b(n), and we must have b(n) < vn/2. Next, (i) of the lemma is now obvious,
and (ii) and (iii) follow from, respectively, (A.13) and (A.12). Because b(n)
is the unique root of hn(b), there cannot exist another equilibrium in which
all n players are active.
— Next, assume that b(n) < vn/2. We then have to prove that there exists
an equilibrium in which all n players are active, and that its bids and eﬀorts
are given by (i) and (ii) of the lemma ((iii) is then automatically satisﬁed).
Note that these satisfy ˆ bi > 0 and ˆ ei > 0, ∀i. It remains to be shown that
each player i maximizes his expected payoﬀ by choosing bi = b(n) and ei = ˆ ei,
given the rivals’ choices ˆ bj and ˆ ej (j 6= i). Consider ci =
P
j6=iˆ bjˆ ej. Note that








































Because b(n) < vi/2, we see that ci < (vi/2)2. Applying part (ii) of Lemma 1,








Clearly, b = b(n) is the (unique) root of ki(b). Thus, indeed, the optimal bid
and eﬀort of player i are given by bi = b(n) and ei = ˆ ei.Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 16
Proof of Theorem 1
We give the proof in 4 steps. Throughout the proof, b(m) denotes the unique
root of the function hm(b) deﬁned in (5), with m = 1,...,n.
— Step 1: First, we show that there is no equilibrium in which only one
agent is active. Suppose there is such an equilibrium and, without loss of




1 > 0. Then Π1 =
v1−b∗
1−e∗
1. By not being active, player 1 can always secure zero payoﬀ. Hence,
v1 − b∗
1 − e∗
1 ≥ 0. For  > 0 suﬃciently small, v1 − (b∗
1 − ) − (e∗
1 − ) > 0.
Thus, player 1 strictly prefers to set (b∗
1 − , e∗
1 − ) rather than (b∗
1,e∗
1), and
the original situation is not an equilibrium. We have a contradiction. In the
remainder, we can therefore concentrate on (candidate) equilibria with more
than 1 player active.
— Step 2: Next, we show that in an equilibrium in which some player s is
active, necessarily all players 1,...,s − 1 are active as well. Suppose there




n) in which exactly t players are active,
with 1 < t < n, and in which both there is a player s who is active and
a player r with vr ≥ vs who is inactive. We will derive a contradiction.
Denote the set of active players in the given equilibrium as T. Consider
the hypothetical contest that is obtained from our original contest with n
players by removing the n−t players with i / ∈ T. Removing these non-active
players does not aﬀect the incentives of the active players in the equilibrium.
Hence, for this hypothetical contest, the bids and eﬀorts b∗
i and e∗
i with i ∈ T
must constitute an equilibrium. Noting that all t players are active in this
equilibrium, we conclude from Lemma 3 that b∗




Also, b(t) < vs/2.
Returning to the original contest with n players, consider now player








i = b(t)2 <
(vs/2)2 ≤ (vr/2)2. Applying part (ii) of Lemma 1, player r prefers to choose
positive bid and eﬀort, rather than b∗
r = e∗
r = 0. Thus, we have a contradic-
tion.
— Step 3: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which the set of active play-
ers is S = {1,...,s} for some 1 < s ≤ n. We show that there cannot exist
another equilibrium in which the set of active players is a strict subset of S.





an equilibrium in which all players are active. From Lemma 3, b(n) < vn/2.




n ) in which
only t players are active, t < n. We will derive a contradiction. Consider the





t ) must be an equilibrium. From Lemma 3,
b∗∗
i = b(t) for all i = 1,...,t, and
Pt
i=1 e∗∗
i = b(t), with b(t) < vt/2. Evaluat-



















thus b(t) < b(n). This implies b(t) < vn/2.





j = (b(t))2 < (vn/2)2 ≤ (vt+1/2)2. Using part (ii) of
Lemma 1, player t + 1 thus prefers positive bid and eﬀort, rather than
b∗∗
t+1 = e∗∗
t+1 = 0. We have a contradiction.
— Step 4: Using steps 1, 2 and 3, we know that if there exists an equilibrium,
in this equilibrium either all players are active, or there is a player with a
‘critical’ valuation such that all players with a valuation larger than or equal
to this critical valuation are active, whereas all players with a lower valuation
are inactive. Also, if the equilibrium exists, it must be unique.
Using Lemma’s 1 and 3, it now follows that the proof of Theorem 1 is
completed if we demonstrate that there exists a value k ∈ (1,n] such that
(a) b(k) < vk/2, and (b) if k < n, we also have b(k) ≥ vk+1/2. By doing
so, we show the existence of an equilibrium in which, in case k = n, all n
players are active, while in case k < n, the players 1,...,k are active and
the players k + 1,...,n are not. First, note that Lemma 2 implies that
b(2) < v2/2. Hence, there is at least one t such that b(t) < vt/2. Second,
suppose now that there does not exist a value k satisfying (a) and (b), i.e.
suppose that the contest has no equilibrium. Then both (i) we must have
b(n) ≥ vn/2 (use Lemma 3) and (ii) for all t < n such that b(t) < vt/2, we
must have b(t) < vt+1/2 (use (a) and (b) mentioned above). We will derive
a contradiction. Consider (ii) and take a t∗ < n such that b(t∗) < vt∗/2.
According to (ii), this implies b(t∗) < vt∗+1/2, thus ht∗(vt∗+1/2) > 0. Since
ht∗(vt∗+1/2) = ht∗+1(vt∗+1/2), this implies ht∗+1(vt∗+1/2) > 0, thus b(t∗+1) <
vt∗+1/2. If t∗+1 = n, then we have a contradiction with (i). If t∗+1 < n, by
induction, repeating the argument ﬁnally implies b(n) < vn/2, which again
violates (i). Thus, (i) and (ii) cannot be both satisﬁed, which establishes
Theorem 1.
Proof of Corollary 1
Using vi = v, ∀i, it follows that the root b(n) of the function hn(b) is equal
to b(n) = (n − 1)v/(2n − 1), thus b(n) < v/2. Part (i) of the corollary thenMarco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 18
follows from (i) of Theorem 1. Invoking symmetry, ˆ ei = ˆ e, ∀i, which implies
(ii).
Proof of Corollary 2
The proof follows directly from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
Proofs of section 4
In section 4, the ﬁrst-order conditions of an interior solution of the maxi-
mization problem of player i, given the bids bj and eﬀorts ej (j 6= i) of his






















































2 (vi − bi) − 1 = 0, (A.16)



























































Using these conditions we present the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that (ˆ b1,...,ˆ bn, ˆ e1,..., ˆ en) is an equilibrium in which all n players
are active. In the equilibrium each player’s expected payoﬀ must be nonneg-
ative. This implies that we must have ˆ bi < vi, ∀i. We further know that the
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which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
Assume that vi = v, ∀i, and β ≤ 1. We will show that there exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium, which is given by parts (i) and (ii) of the theorem.
Imposing symmetry, i.e. bi = ˆ b and ei = ˆ e, ∀i, we observe that ˆ b = 0
and/or ˆ e = 0 is not an equilibrium. Substituting bi = ˆ b > 0 and ei = ˆ e > 0,
∀i, into conditions (A.17) and (A.18), we have
ˆ b =
α(n − 1)v







α(n − 1) + n
. (A.22)
This implies that if there is a symmetric equilibrium, it must be given byˆ b and
ˆ e of (A.21) and (A.22). To show that this indeed constitutes an equilibrium,
we have to prove that player i maximizes his expected payoﬀ by choosing ˆ b
and ˆ e, given the same choices of his rivals.
If i chooses bi = 0, then his corresponding best eﬀort is 0, and his expected
payoﬀ also is. If i chooses ei = 0, then his expected payoﬀ is 0 as well. Now
examine positive bi and ei that satisfy (A.17) and (A.18). These conditions
then reduce to
















where for notational convenience we have deﬁned di =
P
j6=iˆ bαˆ eβ. Note that
di > 0. From (A.23), we must have bi < αv/(1 + α).
Observe that (A.23) and (A.24) are satisﬁed if player i chooses bi = ˆ b and








nv − β(n − 1)v
α(n − 1) + n
!
, (A.25)Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 20
which is positive, since β ≤ 1. The proof is completed if we show that there
exist no other bi ∈ (0,αv/(1 + α)) and ei > 0 that satisfy (A.23) and (A.24)
(which implies that player i indeed globally maximizes his payoﬀ by choosing
bi = ˆ b and ei = ˆ e). To do so, we distinguish two cases: β = 1 and β < 1.
First, take the case β < 1. From (A.23), we obtain that ei = si(bi), where
the continuous auxiliary function si(b) is deﬁned as
si(b) =





for 0 < b < αv/(1 + α). Observe that si(b) is strictly decreasing in b, and
that limb↓0 si(b) = ∞ and limb↑ αv










i + di), (A.27)
which with (A.23) implies that
α
















for 0 < b < αv/(1 + α). Since β < 1, ti(b) is strictly increasing in b, and
limb↓0 ti(b) = 0. As a result, the functions si(b) and ti(b) have a unique point
of intersection. By implication, this unique point of intersection is given by
b = ˆ b. It follows that for player i there exist a unique bid 0 < bi < αv/(1+α)
and a unique eﬀort ei > 0 which satisfy (A.23) and (A.24), i.e. bi = ˆ b and
ei = ˆ ei.
Second, take the case β = 1. It then follows from (A.23) and (A.24) that
ei =







2di(v − bi) = b
α+2
i . (A.31)
It is easy to verify that bi = ˆ b is the unique solution of (A.31). In turn, we
can conclude that for player i there exist a unique 0 < bi < αv/(1+α) and a
unique eﬀort ei > 0 which satisfy (A.23) and (A.24), i.e. bi = ˆ b and ei = ˆ ei.Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 21
Notes
1For recent surveys of this literature, see e.g. Wolfstetter (1996) or Klemperer (1999).
2See further e.g. Dixit (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), and for a concise survey,
Nitzan (1994). Lockard and Tullock (2001) contains a comprehensive collection of articles
on rent seeking.
3In a recent hostile takeover battle, the British telephone company Vodafone bid some
132 billion euro to obtain control of its German rival Mannesmann. Reportedly, both ﬁrms
set aside a total amount of 850 million euro for this ﬁght, trying to inﬂuence the voting
behavior of shareholders. From this amount, 150 million was reserved for advertising. See
The Economist (2000).
4As long as at least one player both submits a positive bid and exerts a positive eﬀort.
We assume that the contest is cancelled, i.e. the prize is not awarded at all, if none of the
players both submits a positive bid and exerts a positive eﬀort.
5Nti (1999) proposes the following way to study how the extent of asymmetry in val-
uation inﬂuences total rent dissipation. Without loss of generality, assume again that






1 + λ −
p




Observe that ∂D/∂λ > 0. Thus, the more equal valuations are (i.e. the higher λ is),
the higher total rent dissipation. Yet, this analysis is in terms of a ﬁxed v1. More equal
valuations then imply a higher v2, while keeping v1 ﬁxed. In this analysis, increased rent
dissipation is not so much due to lower asymmetry, but rather to a higher v2. This can be







1 + µ −
p
1 − µ + µ2

.
Now, ∂D/∂µ > 0. Thus, this suggests that having more equal valuations (i.e. lower µ)
leads to lower dissipation, since we now do the analysis in terms of a ﬁxed v2 rather than
a ﬁxed v1. We prefer our own approach, as it circumvents the above scale eﬀects and leads
to unambiguous results.
6In the special case where β = 1, bids are again equal among agents, regardless of the
size of α. This follows from (A.19) of the Appendix. The results given in section 3 can
easily be generalized to this special case. However, if β 6= 1, bids are no longer equal
among agents.Marco Haan and Lambert Schoonbeek 22
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